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In multi-synchronous collaboration users replicate shared data, modify it and redistribute
modified versions of this data without the need of a central authority. However, in this
model no usage restriction mechanism was proposed to control what users can do with the
data after it has been released to them. In this paper, we extend the multi-synchronous
collaboration model with contracts that express usage restrictions and that are checked a
posteriori by users when they receive the modified data. We propose a merging algorithm
that deals not only with changes on data but also with contracts. A log auditing protocol
is used to detect users who do not respect contracts and to adjust user trust levels. Our
contract-based model was implemented and evaluated by using PeerSim simulator.
Keywords: multi-synchronous collaboration; contract model; usage control; push-pull-
clone model; trust; log auditing.
1. Introduction
Collaboration between a large number of users has emerged for years in the re-
search domain of CSCW (Computer Supported Cooperative Work). Collaboration
can be synchronous13, asynchronous or multi-synchronous.12 Synchronous (or real-
time) collaboration mode allows communication in an instantaneous manner with
bounded time and changes performed by one user are transmitted immediately to
other group members. Asynchronous or non-real time mode conversely makes no
assumption about the time intervals involved between interactions among users.
1
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Multi-synchronous collaboration was introduced firstly by Dourish.12 Multi-
synchronous environment allows private working in cycles of divergence and conver-
gence. Users work simultaneously in isolation in their workspaces and user changes
are not visible to others until they decide to synchronize. Shared data diverges
when users work in isolation and converges later after synchronization of shared
data. Multi-synchronous collaboration model was used not only in research work
such as SAMS28, DSMW37 but also in practical applications such as Distributed
Version Control Systems (DVCS) (e.g. Git23, Mercurial32) and Microsoft SharePoint
Workspace. 9
In multi-synchronous collaboration model, it is very difficult to control what
users will do with the data after it has been released to them and to ensure that
they will not misbehave and violate usage policy. From the view of deontic logic,
usage policy can be expressed in terms of obligation, permission and prohibition.
We model these concepts as contracts. The main issue addressed by this paper is
how contracts can be expressed and checked within multi-synchronous collaboration
model and what actions can be taken in response to users who misbehaved.
We consider, as an example, implicit contracts in DVCS which is an instance
of multi-synchronous working environment. At the beginning, DVCS systems were
mainly used by developers in open-source code projects but nowadays they started
to be widely adopted by companies for source code development. In open source
projects, usage restriction is expressed in the license of the code, while in closed
source code projects, it is expressed in the contracts developers sign when accept-
ing their job. In both cases, usage restrictions are checked a posteriori outside the
collaborative environment with social control or plagiarism detection. As a result
of observations concerning usage violation, trustworthiness on the users who misbe-
haved is implicitly decreased and collaboration with those users risks to be ceased.
We aim at building a contract-based model that can express explicitly usage re-
strictions which are checked within a collaborative environment.
Access control mechanisms do not address the issue of usage restriction after
data was released to users. Traditional access control mechanisms prevent users
from accessing to data and granted rights are checked before access is allowed. It has
been shown that these access control mechanisms are too strict.11 There exist some
optimistic approaches46 that can control access a posteriori. In these approaches, if
user actions violate granted rights, a recovery mechanism is applied and all carried-
out operations are removed. Usually, this recovery mechanism requires a centralized
authority which ensures that the recovery is taken by the whole system. However, a
recovery mechanism is difficult to be applied in decentralized systems such as DVCS
where a user has no knowledge of the global network of collaboration. Roughly
speaking, access control mechanisms aim at ensuring that systems are used correctly
by authorized users with authorized actions. Rather than ensuring such a strong
security model, we target a flexible approach based on contracts that can be checked
after users gained access to data and based on trust management mechanisms that
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help users collaborate with other users they trust.
Push-Pull-Clone (PPC) is one of paradigms supporting multi-synchronous col-
laboration. In PPC model, users replicate shared data, modify it and redistribute
modified versions of this data by using the primitives push, pull and clone. Users
clone shared data and maintain in their local workspaces this data as well as changes
done on it. Users can then push their changes to many channels at any time they
want, and other users who have granted rights may pull these changes from these
channels. By using pull primitives replicas are synchronized.
The main issue in designing a contract-based multi-synchronous collaboration
is that contracts are objects that are part of the replication mechanism. In our
contract-based model each user maintains a local workspace that contains shared
data and contracts for the usage restriction of that data as well as changes on
data. Changes done locally on the data together with specified contracts are shared
with other users. Algorithms for merging and for conflict resolution have to deal
not only with data changes but also with contracts. For checking if users respect
contracts, a log auditing mechanism is used. According to auditing results, users
adjust their trust levels assigned to their collaborators. To our best knowledge, there
is no existing collaborative editing model based on contracts which allows auditing
and updating trust levels during collaboration process. Major contributions of this
paper are as follows:
• A PPC model extended with contracts for multi-synchronous collaboration
that we call the C-PPC model. The proposed model ensures consistency of
the shared document.
• A log auditing mechanism to detect user misbehavior in contract-based
collaboration model.
• A set of experiments to evaluate the performance of the C-PPC model and
the log auditing mechanism by using a peer-to-peer simulator.
This paper is an extension of our previous published work.49 We present a real
world motivating example for our approach and more details about deontic concepts
that are used in the formalisation of the contract model. In addition, we classify
different types of contract conflicts and present the solution to deal with these
conflicts. Furthermore, we complete the C-PPC model with a log auditing protocol
and provide some additional discussion around this model.
The paper is structured as follows. We start by presenting an overview of our
proposed approach in Section 2. We then describe the C-PPC model in Section
3, including representation of logs of operations and formalisation of contracts ex-
pressed inside the model. In section 4, we present aspects of collaborative process
over C-PPC model: logging changes, push and pull protocols, consistency model,
log auditing and trust assessment mechanisms. We report some experimental results
of simulation to evaluate the efficiency of our model in Section 5. In Section 6, we
review related approaches and point out their differences from our work. We end
the paper with some concluding remarks and directions for future work in Section
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7.
2. Approach Overview
We consider a collaboration model that requires high levels of respect and trust
among users. To create a trustful and respectful collaborative environment, we
introduce collaboration contracts that will be used in collaborative interactions. In
this section, we present an overview of our C-PPC model which extends the PPC
model with contracts.
Let us give a simple example to illustrate how C-PPC model works in a real world
example of collaboratively building a photo collection. Nowadays it is very common
that people share photos. Photos help people stay in touch with their family and
friends all around the world. They take photos in their daily life experience coming
from many contexts such as from a wedding to a vacation or from a local meeting to
an international conference. After an event where many people took many photos,
people who joined the event want to share those photos with each other. By that
way they can remember all little moments they might have missed during the event.
Together users can build a great photo-based story for the event in which they
participated.
Pierre
Olivia
Tom
Alex
insert(comment 1)
insert(comment1)
edit is permitted
share Pierre->Tom
share is permitted insert(comment 2)
insert(comment1)
edit is permitted
share Pierre->Tom
share is permitted
insert(comment2)
share Tom->Alex
delete is forbidden
share is permitted
insert is obligatory
(a)
(b)
insert(comment 1)
edit is forbidden
share Pierre->Olivia
share is permitted
(c)
insert(comment 3)
delete(comment 1)
insert(comment 5)
share Tom->Alex
delete is forbidden
share is permitted
insert is obligatory
insert(comment 5)
share Alex->Tom
delete is forbidden
(d)
(e)
insert(comment 4)
(f)
edit is permitted
share is permitted
delete is forbidden
share is permitted
insert is obligatory
edit is forbidden
share is permitted
edit is forbidden
delete is forbidden
share is obligatory
share is forbidden
detect 
misbehavior
contracts 
conflict
share is obligatory
Fig. 1. A Push-Pull-Clone collaboration scenario of four users over a photo X between Time 1
and Time 2. User actions are recorded chronologically.
We assume a friend-to-friend network of four users Alex, Tom, Olivia, and Pierre.
We suppose that users can edit photos by means of adding and deleting comments.
At the beginning, the network is built based on social trust between users and
connections are established only between users who trust each other. Users trust
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their collaborators with different trust levels that are updated according to their
collaboration experience. For instance, Pierre trusts both Tom and Olivia, however,
with different trust levels, and thus he gives them different contracts over the shared
photo. For example, Pierre gives Tom the permission to edit and to share, while he
gives Olivia only the permission to share the photo. Receivers are expected to follow
these contracts; otherwise, their trust levels will be adjusted once misbehavior is
detected. We log changes that users do on the photo collection with contracts that
they receive from others when they receive their changes. Assume that in the time
interval [Time 1, Time 2 ], Alex, Tom, Olivia, and Pierre perform their local changes
on the collection.
Alex Tom
Olivia Pierre
0.6
0.7
0.2
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.6 0.7
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.2
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.6 0.7
0.1
Alex Tom
Olivia Pierre
Time 1 Time 2
Fig. 2. Trust values at two different times Time 1 and Time 2.
Let us assume that user trust values at a time instance Time 1 are shown in Fig.
2 in which values are real numbers ranged in the interval [0, 1]. However, trust values
change over time based on user’s assessment. The values we take in this example
show the implicit trust each user has on others. A user has no global knowledge of
the trust values that each user assigns to others, but knows directly only the trust
values he assigned to other users.
Our model uses push, pull and clone as native direct pair-wise communica-
tion primitives between users. To work with others, a user simply sets up a local
workspace, and uses trusted channels to push her changes to trusted friends. Other
users can then get the photo by cloning (executing a clone primitive) it into their
workspaces. In this way, they have independent local workspaces for the shared
data. They do their changes on their local replicas and publish changes by execut-
ing a push primitive. The user then executes a pull primitive to get the changes
into his local workspace. Push, pull, and clone primitives are used for efficient dis-
tributed collaboration and they were already implemented in distributed version
control systems such as Git and Mercurial. We assume the system uses a FIFO
channel between two users for changes propagation to guarantee that messages are
received in the order they are sent. This order can be preserved by using logical
timestamps to sort messages into chronological order.
In Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, after Time 1, Pierre trusts Tom with a trust value 0.6.
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Pierre makes a change on photo X by adding a new comment comment 1. He shares
his change on photo X with Tom with the contract {edit is permitted, share is
permitted} (step a). The change and the contract are pushed to a communication
channel with Tom. As it is the first time that Tom initiates a communication with
Pierre, he has to clone photo X with changes from Pierre. Tom now has in his
local workspace a clone of the photo collection from Pierre, on which he can work
in isolation. In the example, Tom adds another comment to the photo comment
2. Since he has the right to distribute further the data, he then shares it with
his trusted friend Alex (step b). Tom wants Alex to redistribute the collection of
photos only after adding her own comment on photo X. He therefore shares his
data with the contract {delete is forbidden, share is permitted, insert is obligatory}.
Concurrently, Pierre collaborates also with Olivia. He trusts her less than Tom and
he wants to forbid her from editing the photo while allowing her to share it. Pierre
specifies the contract {edit is forbidden, share is permitted}. Olivia thus has no right
to edit photo X after she receives it from Pierre (step c).
Olivia violates the contract she received from Pierre by deleting Pierre’s com-
ment and adding her comment, comment 3, to photo X. She continues to collaborate
with Tom by specifying the contract that he is forbidden to delete any comment on
the photo (step d). As soon as Tom receives the changes from Olivia, he discovers
that she misbehaved. He thus updates the trust value on Olivia. The Fig. 2 shows
that her trust level at Time 2 is decreased to 0.1.
In parallel, Pierre adds a new comment, comment 4, to photo X. He wants the
comment is kept private except for Tom. He thus shares the photo with this new
comment with his friend Tom, but with the restriction of not sharing it further,
{share is forbidden} (step f). Tom receives the data with the new contract from
Pierre. This contract conflicts with the contracts he holds after synchronizing with
Alex (step e) which is {share is obligatory}. As Tom wants to be able to further
modify and share the photo, he decides to resolve the conflict, for example, by
discarding the changes from Pierre, or by negotiating to relax the prohibition of
sharing.
In the example, Alex behaves well by always respecting contracts she has re-
ceived. She adds comment 5 to photo X and shares it with Tom by restricting him
not to delete the added comments with the contract {delete is forbidden, share is
obligatory} (step e). After these user interactions in the time interval [Time 1, Time
2 ], user trust values are illustrated at Time 2 in Fig. 2.
We have given an illustration of how the C-PPC model can be used for the
collaboration between four users Alex, Tom, Olivia, and Pierre on the assumption
that users trust each other at different trust levels. We move next to the formal
representation of our C-PPC model.
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3. C-PPC Model
In this section, we describe main parts of our target model: users, logs of operations
on shared document and contracts between users.
3.1. Users
Users are main participants in the C-PPC model. They are connected in a collabo-
rative network based on the trust they have in other users. However, users are not
uniformly trusted by others. Each user keeps at his local site the replica of shared
documents and works locally on these replicas. For the sake of simplicity we con-
sider that all users (also called sites throughout this paper) are collaborating on a
single shared document.
3.2. Document, Changes and Logs
The system keeps a document as a log of operations that have been done during
the collaborative process. The log maintains information about user’s contributions
to different parts of the document and when these contributions were performed.
The outcome of collaboration is a document that could be obtained by replaying
the write operations such as insert, delete, update from the log. Two users can
write independently on the shared document. Changes are propagated in weakly
consistent manner that a user can decide when, with whom and what data is sent
and synchronized. Push, pull and clone communication primitives are operated on
FIFO channels for allowing an ordered exchange of operations done on document
replicas. A replica log contains all operations that have been generated locally or
received from other users. Logs are created and updated at user sites. The log
structure is defined in the following definitions.
Definition 3.1. (Event) Let P be a set of operations {insert, delete, edit, share}
that users can generate; and let T be a set of event types {write, communication,
contract}. An event e is defined as a triplet of 〈evt ∈ T, op ∈ P, attr〉, in which
attr includes attributes which are in form of {attr name, attr value} to present
additional information for each event.
Definition 3.2. (Log) A document log L is defined as an append-only ordered
list of events in the form [e1, e2, . . . , en].
Users store operations in their logs in an order that is consistent with the gener-
ated order. The event corresponding to a share operation of type communication is
issued when a user pushes his changes and it is logged at the site of receiver when
this one performs a pull. This share event can be followed in the log by an event of
type contract representing usage policies for the shared data.
In Fig. 3 we give an example of a log containing a single event that has three
attributes. The log is presented in XML format. The write event refers to insert
operation and belongs to write type. The event has attributes {by, P ierre} (done
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<log> <!-- at local site of Pierre -->
<event>
<evt>write</evt>
<op>insert</op>
<attr>
<by>Pierre</by>
<content>comment 1</content>
<gsn>1</gsn> <!--generation timestamp -->
</attr>
</event>
</log>
Fig. 3. An example of log with one event in XML format.
by Pierre), {content, comment1} and {GSN, 1} for the sequence number when the
event is generated.
The event attribute GSN (generate sequence number) of an event is assigned
at the site where event was generated. The event attribute RSN (receive sequence
number) of either a communication or a contract event is assigned at reception of
this event by receiving site. We will discuss how to use these sequence numbers later
in Section 4.
3.3. Contract
A contract expresses usage policies which one user expects others to respect when
they receive and use shared data. Contracts are built on the top of basic deon-
tic logic55 with the normative concepts of obligation, permission and prohibition
representing what one ought to, may, or must not do.
Contract in C-PPC model is different from traditional usage policy that is pre-
sented accompanied with application systems. For example, W3C platform for pri-
vacy preference P3P52, which uses preference exchange language, APPEL51, is an
industry standard that provides a method for users to gain control over the use
of personal information collected by web sites they visited. Our approach does not
require additional platform to express contracts. Instead, contract is a part of repli-
cation system and it is built over operations within application domain.
3.3.1. Symbolism of deontic concepts
Let us start first with our review of deontic logic. Deontic logic is one of four main
groups of modalities that the philosopher Von Wright mentioned in his papers55
(the alethic models or models of truth, the epistemic models or models of knowing,
the deontic models or models of obligation and the existential models or models
of existence). Deontic logic is used as the logic of rights and duties. In the deontic
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models, the first preliminary concept is the act that is pronounced obligatory, per-
mitted and forbidden. The word act is used for properties and not for individuals,
for example, steal or smoke are acts. The negation of a given act is performed by a
subject, if and only if, it does not perform the given act. For example, the negation
of the act of answering a question is the act of not answering it.
The philosopher von Wright considers the concept of permission is true on formal
grounds, then defines the concept of the obligatory and the forbidden. The deontic
concepts that are applied to a single act follows.
“If an act is not permitted, it is called forbidden. For instance, theft is not
permitted, hence it is forbidden. We are not allowed to steal, hence we must
not steal.”
“If the negation of an act is forbidden, the act itself is called obligatory. For
instance: it is forbidden to disobey the law, hence it is obligatory to obey
the law. We ought to do that which we are not allowed not to do.”
“If an act and its negation are both permitted, the act is called indifferent.
For instance: in a smoking compartment we may smoke, but we may also
not smoke. Hence smoking is here a morally indifferent form of behavior.
[..] Indifference is a narrower category than permission. Everything indif-
ferent is permitted but everything permitted is not indifferent. For, what
is obligatory is also permitted , but not indifferent.”
(Deontic logic55, pages 3-4).
The norms derived from deontic concepts of the permitted, the obligatory and
the forbidden are permission, obligation and prohibition, respectively. We build the
contract on the top of these norms and handle them in distributed manner. For
the permission, we distinguish a permission that can be either a strong permission
or a weak permission.56 The permission, which is an exception of an obligation
and a prohibition, is a strong permission. The permission which follows from the
absence of a prohibition, is a weak permission. If an act is strongly permitted then
its negation is permitted, whereas if an act is weakly permitted then its negation
is forbidden. With a strong permission, a subject always can choose to perform the
act or not, while it is not the case for weak permission.
We illustrate the concepts of deontic logic model in Fig. 4. We will summarize
how these deontic norms are symbolized as a formal logic following von Wright
model.
We use A to denote a name of an act and ∼A is used as a name of its negation.
The proposition that the act named by A is permitted is expressed in symbols by
PA. The proposition that the act named by A is forbidden, which is the negation of
the proposition that it is permitted, is symbolized by ∼PA or FA. The proposition
that the act named by A is obligatory, which is the negation of the proposition
that the negation of the act is permitted, is symbolized by ∼P∼A. We use simpler
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forbidden
permitted
obligatory
indifferent
permitted
Fig. 4. Three deontic concepts that cover all possibilities assigned to an act. The act is only either
forbidden, obligatory or permitted indifferently.
symbol for the obligatory, OA. The proposition that the act named by A, which is
called indifferent, is symbolized by (PA)&(P∼A). In this symbolism, P , O, F are
called the deontic operators. Sentences of the type “P name of act(s)“ are called
P-sentences. Similarly, we might have O-sentences and F-sentences. Also we have
“permitted”, “obligatory”, “forbidden” as deontic values.
The above deontic operators apply to a single act with what we call an atomic
name. Since we can define the conjunction, disjunction, implication of two given
acts to be what we call a molecular name, we can apply deontic operators to pairs
of acts as well. If A and B denote acts, then A&B is used as a name for their
conjunction, A ∨ B as a name for their disjunction, A → B as a name of their
implication.
Considering the distribution property of deontic operators, wrong conclusions
might be taken with respect to the application of these operators. We first con-
sider negation operation. If the act A is permitted, we can conclude nothing to
the permitted, forbidden or obligatory as character of ∼A. Sometimes ∼A is per-
mitted, sometimes not. From the Fig. 4 we can see that A might be obligatory or
indifferent. If A is obligatory as well as permitted, then ∼A would be forbidden.
If A is what we call indifferent, then ∼A is also permitted. For example, in smok-
ing compartment, smoking and not-smoking is permitted. But in the non-smoking
compartment, not-smoking is permitted but smoking is forbidden.
We next consider distribution property in the conjunction of two acts. If both A
and B are permitted, it does not mean A&B is permitted because doing either of
them may commit us not to do the other. For example, it is permitted to promise
to give a thing and it is also permitted not to give a thing, but it is forbidden to
promise to give a thing and then not give it.
We finally consider distribution property in the disjunction of two acts. If at
least one of the acts A and B is permitted, it follows that their disjunction A ∨ B
is permitted. When both acts are forbidden, their disjunction is forbidden.
The von Wright deontic model includes also laws of deontic logic. A true proposi-
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tion, that a certain molecular P-/O-sentence expresses a deontic tautology, is called
a law of deontic logic. We summarize below these laws from notions of permission
and obligation. It should be noticed that the combining force order follows that “∼”
is stronger than “&”, “&” is stronger than “∨”, and “∨” is stronger than “→”.
• Two laws on the relation of permission and obligation:
(1) PA is identical with ∼O∼A.
(2) OA entails PA.
• Four laws for the dissolution of deontic operators:
(1) OA&B is identical with OA&OB .
(2) PA&B is identical with PA ∨ PB .
(3) OA ∨OB entails OA∨B .
(4) PA&B entails PA&PB .
• Seven laws on commitment (doing an act commits to do another act if the
implication of one to another is obligatory):
(1) OA&OA→B entails OB . This law is intuitively obvious. If doing an
act that is obligatory commits us to do another act, then this act is
obligatory also.
(2) PA&OA→B entails PB . If doing what we are free to do commits us
to do another act, then this act is permitted to do also.
(3) ∼PB&OA→B entails ∼PA. This is a vice versa law of the law above.
If doing an act commits us to a forbidden, then this act is forbidden
also.
(4) OA→B∨C&∼PB&∼PC entails ∼PA. This law is an extension of
above law. Doing an act that commits us to a choice of forbidden
alternatives, then this act is forbidden also.
(5) ∼(OA∨B&∼PA&∼PB). This law means it is impossible to oblige
to choose between forbidden alternatives.
(6) OA&O(A&B)→C entails OB→C . This law means that if doing two
acts, one of which being obligatory, commits us to do a third act, then
doing the second act commits us to do the third act.
(7) O∼A→A entails OA. If it is failure to perform an act commits us
to perform it, then this act is obligatory.
Combining two acts into a molecular act might lead to the incompatible. Two
acts are incompatible if their conjunction is forbidden. For example, reading and
smoking both are not permitted in library, so they are incompatible.
3.3.2. From deontic modalities to contracts
Based on deontic concepts, we formalize contract in our target model as follows.
Definition 3.3. (contract primitive). For a set of n possible operations P =
{op1, op2, . . . , opn}, a contract primitive is denoted by a deontic operator followed
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by a write or a communication operation. A contract primitive is an event in log
that takes deontic operators P (the permitted), O (the obligatory), F (the forbid-
den) as modality attributes (so-called modal). If op is an operation in P then the
contract primitive cop based on op is denoted as: Fop (doing op is forbidden), Oop
(doing op is obligatory), and Pop (doing op is permitted). When we use the generic
notation c it means that the contract c can refer to any operation.
Definition 3.4. (contract). A contract C is a collection or a set of con-
tract primitive(s) which are built on the operations of P. It is denoted as
CP = {cop1 , cop2 , . . . , copn}. Alternatively, we can use the notation C =
{cop1 , cop2 , . . . , copn} for a contract.
For example, in Fig. 1, Pierre inserts a comment into photo X and gives it to Tom
with a contract C{edit, share} = {Pedit, Pshare} (edit and share are permitted) with
two single contract primitives Pedit and Pshare. When a user shares data by means
of a push primitive, at the site of the receiver, a share event is logged with attributes
representing users who sent and received the changes. Moreover, contract events are
logged describing the contracts received. In Fig. 5, we illustrate the representation
of the log at site of Tom after he cloned photo X from Pierre.
If we have n contract primitives, we can obtain a contract by merging these
contract primitives. For instance, if we have two contract primitives c1 = Pop1 (op1
is permitted) and c2 = Oop2 (op2 is obligatory), then we can build the contract
C{op1,op2} = {Pop1 , Oop2}. Concerning merging contract primitives to obtain a
contract, we consider two following axioms:
(A1) C = {c1} & (c1 → c2) −→ C = {c1, c2} (deducibility)
(A2) C = {c1op, ..., cnop} & (c1op  c2op  . . .  cnop) −→ C = {c1op} (priority)
(“” denotes a higher priority relationship between two contract primitives or two
operations).
The axiom (A1) shows the consequent deducibility. We assume a set of inference
rules can be defined among the contract primitives in the system. Following this
axiom, if c1 ∈ C and c1 → c2 then c2 ∈ C. At a certain time if the user u has a
contract C that contains c1 and respecting c1 commits to respecting c2 then even
if c2 is not explicitly given to user u, c2 is added to C. This is helpful to reduce
the number of contract primitives given at a certain sharing time since users do
not have to specify contracts that can be inferred from other contract primitives
based on deducible rules of system settings. For instance, if we suppose that Oedit
→ Pinsert, then C = {Oedit} & (Oedit → Pinsert) −→ C = {Oedit, Pinsert}. This
means if a user receives an obligation to edit, she will have the permission to insert
automatically since the setting of inference rule Oedit → Pinsert holds. Another
example, if system allows Pedit → Pinsert then C = {Pedit} & (Pedit → Pinsert) −→
C = {Pedit, Pinsert}.
The axiom (A2) rules the merging process of different contract primitives refer-
ring to a same operation. If we have n contract primitives referring to an operation
op with priority order c1op  . . .  cnop then these contract primitives can be merged
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<log> <!-- at local site of Tom -->
<event>
<evt>write</evt><op>insert</op>
<attr>
<by>Pierre</by>
<content>comment 1</content>
<gsn>1</gsn>
</attr>
</event>
<event>
<evt>share</evt><op>share</op>
<attr>
<by>Pierre</by>
<to>Tom</to>
<gsn>2</gsn>
<rsn>1</rsn> <!-- receipt timestamp -->
</attr>
</event>
<event>
<evt>contract</evt><op>edit</op>
<attr>
<by>Pierre</by><to>Tom</to>
<modal>P</modal>
<gsn>3</gsn>
<rsn>2</rsn>
</attr>
</event>
<event>
<evt>contract</evt><op>share</op>
<attr>
<by>Pierre</by><to>Tom</to>
<modal>P</modal>
<gsn>4</gsn>
<rsn>3</rsn>
</attr>
</event>
</log>
Fig. 5. An example of log containing contract events
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and the resulting contract is deducible as C = {c1op}. For instance, if C = {Fop, Pop}
and Fop  Pop then it is deducible to have a contract C = {Fop}. This means that
even though op is permissive with the contract primitive Pop, it is forbidden to
perform op if C = {Fop} and C = {Pop} are merged with the condition Fop  Pop.
3.3.3. Contract conflict
When multiple users work on the same shared data and share their changes to one
another under different contracts, it is not possible to ensure that the system will be
conflict-free regarding these contracts. Therefore it is necessary to identify conflicts,
to detect conflicts and to propose conflict resolution strategies.
The term deontic conflict and deontic inconsistency have been used interchange-
ably in the literature. In the book On Law and Justice, Ross41 identifies three
ways in which inconsistency in law arises: “total-total”, “total-partial” and “partial-
partial”.
(1) Total-total inconsistency: this means neither of a pair of norms is applicable
without conflicting with the other. If the conditional facts of each norm are sym-
bolized by a circle, a total-total inconsistency occurs when the two circles coincide
(Fig. 6a). In total-total inconsistency two norms are absolutely incompatible. This
is thus said strong inconsistency since no norm can be performed without causing
norm violations. For example, the total-total inconsistency arises when an action is
simultaneously obligatory and forbidden.
conflict area
conflict area
conflict areac1
c2
c1
c2 c1 c2
(a) Total-Total inconsistency (b) Total-Partial inconsistency (c) Partial-Partial inconsistency
Fig. 6. Three ways of inconsistencies.
(2) Total-partial inconsistency: this means one of the two norms is not applicable
in any case without coming into conflict with the other, whereas the other norm
does not conflict in all cases with the first one. Such inconsistency occurs where one
circle lies inside the other. (Fig. 6b). As an example, the total-partial inconsistency
arises when an action is simultaneously permitted and forbidden.
(3) Partial-partial inconsistency: this means each of the two norms has cases that
conflict with the other but also cases in which no conflict arises. This inconsistency
exists when two circles intersect. (Fig. 6c). We can see this inconsistency in an
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example which a person is obliged to attend a concert but the entering to the
theatre without ticket is forbidden. The partial-partial inconsistency arises between
two norms which are the obligation to attend and the prohibition to enter without
ticket. If the person has a ticket, then she can fulfill one of two norms or both
without causing violation to the other. In this case, she can enter the theatre, and
by attending the concert, she fulfills the obligation requiring her to attend it. By
this, no conflict arises. However, if she does not have a ticket, then she cannot
act following one norm without violating the other. Without having a ticket, when
she respects the prohibition to enter by staying outside, she violates the obligation
to attend the concert. In contrast, when she fulfills the requirement to attend the
concert, she will violate the prohibition not allowing her to enter without ticket.
Through the example we see two norms that are incompatible in once case and
compatible in another case.
Ross41 also figures out that in judging inconsistencies an important part is the re-
lationship between statutes where conflict occurs. Inconsistency is drawn (a) within
the same statute or (b) between older and more recent statutes.
Concerning inconsistencies, in the normative discourse, the unrealizability is
mentioned with two conditions: (i) the norm belonging to a set of norms must
be individually realizable. This condition means each single norm should not be
impossible to conform; (ii) however, the norms in that set of norms are not jointly
realizable. This means what is prescribed by a set of norms cannot be performed
simultaneously.
Definition 3.5. (contract consistency) A contract which is a collection (or a set)
of contract primitives (norms of obligations, permissions, and prohibitions), is con-
sistent, if and only if, its contract primitives are simultaneously jointly realizable.
Inconsistencies arise due to the incompatibility of the deontic operators. The
deontic square of opposition (Fig. 7), which is based on Aristotle’s philosophy (as
stated by Moretti30) about logic square and first used in deontic logic by Bentham5,
depicts the relationship between norms. It shows four types of inconsistencies be-
tween four deontic modalities.
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(not forbidden)
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Prohibition Obligationcontrary
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Fig. 7. Deontic square of opposition.
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(1) Contraries: the pair obligation and prohibition forms this opposition. An
action cannot be obligatory and forbidden simultaneously. This is a total-total in-
consistency since both norms may be false.
(2) Contradictories: strong permission and prohibition, obligation and weak per-
mission form this opposition. One norm in each pair of norms is true. An action is
either permitted or forbidden as well as an action is either obligatory or omissible.
(3) Implication: obligation implies weak permission, prohibition implies strong
permission. If an action is obligatory, then it cannot be forbidden, thus its permission
is possible. Also, if an action is forbidden, then it cannot be obligatory, and thus
its omission is possible.
(4) Sub-contrary : from the contrary of obligation and prohibition, strong per-
mission (PA&P∼A) and weak permission PA are contrary to each other. An action
may be performed if it is not forbidden, as well as it may be omitted if it is not
obligatory.
According to this square, there are three possibilities for an action that is either
forbidden, obligatory or indifferent (permitted but not obliged) (this is consistent
with what is shown in Fig. 4). From this square we can observe that the contrary
relationship between prohibition and obligation raises the real conflict (total-total
inconsistency). The situation when an action is simultaneously obliged and forbid-
den influences behaviors in conflicting fashion in the sense that it is impossible to
do the action that is compliant with one norm without conflicting the other. For
the pair permission and prohibition, we adopt the view that their contradictory is
an inconsistency but not a real total-total conflict. This comes from the fact that
a permission may not be acted on, so no real conflict occurs between permission
and prohibition. Therefore from our view, real conflict rather than normal incon-
sistency arises only between obligation and prohibition. In our model, we assume
users should be able to perform actions and therefore contracts must not be incon-
sistent or they must not contain any inconsistency or conflict between their contract
primitives.
Even though each contract is conflict free, conflicts may arise when two con-
tracts are merged during synchronization phase. The fact that two users assert two
contract primitives that are inconsistent is quite frequent. It is even possible for
one and the same user to assert two inconsistent contract primitives. If we want
that users collaborate in contract-compliant manner, we must resolve conflicts. The
important thing is to identify inconsistencies and to examine the techniques used
to remove them.
Definition 3.6. (contract conflict) Two contracts C1 and C2 conflict if at least one
contract primitive ci ∈ C1 conflicts with one another cj ∈ C2. Contract primitives
are conflicting between Oop and Fop. Besides, two contracts are inconsistent to each
other if at least one contract primitive ci ∈ C1 is inconsistent with one another
cj ∈ C2.
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3.3.4. Conflict resolution
We present in this section our solution to deal with inconsistencies of contracts.
There is no fixed principles for conflict resolution. In order to ensure the consis-
tency of contracts in the system, conflicts are resolved based on several criterias.
Contracts, among which a real conflict arises, cannot co-exist in the contractual
system, hence they must be avoided. One way to do this is by means of negoti-
ation between users. In this case, the system should inform contracting partners
about their contractual situation and what are the conflicting contracts on which
operations. Then contracting partners decide how obligations and prohibitions can
be “relaxed” in order to allow additional options for further actions. For example,
Figure 8 depicts the case that conflict need to be negotiated to precede further
work of contracting partners. In the figure we can see even the conjunction of two
obligations might create conflict. Say, a night club is obliged to close emergency
exit to prevent crimes quit for drugs (Oop1 from police department), and a night
club is obliged to open emergency exit (Oop2 from fire safety). In this case Oop1&op2
is inconsistent and two obligations are not realizable at the same time. In current
work, we consider only the inconsistency between deontic operators (P , F and O)
and not yet between semantic content of actions under those operators.
Contract C1
Fop1
Oop
2
Contract C 2
Pop1 Fop2
Oop3
Fig. 8. A scenario when a user adopts two contracts that are inconsistent with each other. The
user holds Contract 1 and a coming one Contract 2. The conflict between Oop2 and Fop2 needs to
be resolved to proceed further actions.
In case of partial inconsistencies only, inconsistent contracts can co-exist. For
example, in Fig. 8, if we eliminate the conflict between Oop2 and Fop2 , there still
remains the partial inconsistency between Fop1 and Pop1 . In this case if the user
is not performing op1 then Fop1 and Pop1 are both respected and therefore no real
conflict occurs. Similarly, if Fop1 and Pop1 are both given by the same user and
Pop1 overrides Fop1 (we discuss overriding rules later) then no real conflict occurs.
Even though this type of inconsistency can exist in the system, it is better to re-
duce inconsistency possibilities. Users should be informed about their contractual
situation when a synchronization is performed. This helps them choosing between
different contracts the ones that give them better benefit. In what follows we de-
scribe a method for ordering contracts based on the order of operations associated
with them.
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3.3.5. Ordering contracts
Contract primitives are naturally interrelated and interdependent and there is no
hierarchy between them. Thus, some priorities can be established in terms of par-
ticular objectives and they vary depending on particular applications. One way to
select a contract in the case of conflict is to assign orders to various contract prim-
itives, and sort them in ascending or descending order and then compare contracts
composed of them. The hierarchical ordering of contracts enables users to give pref-
erences to some contracts over others. In that case, the set of contract primitives is
not a normal set but a partially ordered set and the ordering relations are intrinsic
to the contracts in the system.
Depending on the operation types, the order of contract primitives is given as
follows. Operations are categorized to different groups according to their types.
Given two operations op1 and op2 with the priority order op1  op2, then the order
of contract primitives with the same deontic operator is assigned according to the
order of operations, cop1  cop2 . If the contract primitives associated with operations
belong to different groups, then we determine a combined order for each, based on
the order within group and the order of the group.
We formalize the method to order single operations as well as sets of operations.
Our method is inspired from the work of Cholvya and Hunterb.8 We present below
the ordering of operations within single category and across multiple categories,
and next is our solution to compare contracts.
• Ordering categories of operations: Each category includes a set of operations
referring to a specific kind of action. Let us consider two categories Λ1 =
[α1, ..., αm] and Λ2 = [β1, ..., βn]. The ordering of Λ1 and Λ2 is given based
on the priority of them in a particular system. In addition, the order of Λ1
and Λ2 implies the order of every operation of Λ1 and Λ2. For example,
Λ1 > Λ2 ⇒ αi > βj ∀αi ∈ Λ1, βj ∈ Λ2.
• Ordering operations within a single category: Operations in a single cate-
gory of actions can be put in a hierarchical order specific to a particular
system. For two operations α1 and α2, their orders should be either α1 > α2
or α1 < α2. For example, (add-comment > read) in category edit.
To compare two contracts, let P be a set of n operations that could be ordered as
[op1, op2, . . ., opn] from the highest to the lowest priority conforming to the orders
of operations within each category (if any) and between categories as presented
above. Let S be a set of n-digit ternary numbers from 0 to 3n− 1 and a contract C
composed of m contract primitives built over operations of P, C = {c1, c2, . . ., cm},
ci = Popj |Oopj |Fopj , ci ∈ C, opj ∈ P, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n as a list of contract C
where contract primitives are ordered following operation order.
To order contract, we set norms in some kind of hierarchy, some is regarded
as more basic than others. Without losing generality, let us assume that deontic
operators are ordered as P  O  F ; also operations in P are put in order opn 
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opn−1  . . .  op1. A mapping from C to S results in s ∈ S. For each opj ∈ P,
1 ≤ j ≤ n, we set:
• If ∃ci = Popj |Oopj |Fopj ∈ C then:
(1) if ci = Popj then s[j]3 = 2, where 1 ≤ i ≤ m;
(2) if ci = Oopj then s[j]3 = 1, where 1 ≤ i ≤ m;
(3) if ci = Fopj then s[j]3 = 0, where 1 ≤ i ≤ m;
• If 6 ∃ci ∈ C, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, then s[j]3 = 2. This case presents the absence of
any contract specified on operation opj . We take the positive view that the
absence of obligations and prohibitions implies the permission. Therefore,
s[j] is set value as 2, as same as in case that opj is permitted.
The comparison of two contracts C1 and C2 is based on the comparison of their
corresponding digital numbers [s1]3 (mapped from C1) and [s2]3 (mapped from C2).
We have (C1 > C2) ⇔ (s1 > s2) and vice versa.
For instance, given a set P of two operations (n=2 ) in the order op2  op1, and
we want to compare two contracts C1 = {Oop1 , Pop2} and C2 = {Oop2}. The 2-digit
ternary numbers s1 = [12]3 and s2 = [21]3 are mapped from C1, C2 to S. Since
s2 > s1, so that {Oop2} > {Oop1 , Pop2}, hence, C2 > C1.
This ordering mechanism helps users to make decision in case of inconsistencies
to choose the contracts with more benefits. It is important to make users aware
of what is added to the system might introduce inconsistency. Furthermore, in a
peer-to-peer network with no central authority that maintains the consistency of
contracts, once conflicts are detected, they should be resolved or adapted by users.
3.3.6. Repealing contracts
In addition to adding contracts to data when it is shared with collaborators, our
approach supports removal of given contracts. We consider the overriding rule to
repeal contracts issued in the past.
Overriding rule allows that an old contract is replaced by a new one. In this
case the new contract overrides the old one. The contract primitive c2 overrides c1
if both c1 and c2 are given by the same sender to the same receiver and c2 was
sent later than c1. We can express this by c2 overrides c1 ⇐⇒ (c1.op = c2.op) and
(c1.attr.by = c2.attr.by) and (c1.attr.to = c2.attr.to) and (c2 was received after c1).
Let us present an example of contract overriding when Tom realizes that the
operation op under the contract primitive cop = Fop he gave to Alex some time ago
should not be forbidden any longer because conditions that made the prohibition
of performing op have changed. He wants to permit Alex to do op. Since previous
changes performed together with given contracts were logged and shared with many
users, the only solution for removing the prohibition is by compensation. Tom can
override the prohibition by giving a new contract to Alex. Once the new contract
is accepted by Alex, the prohibition is removed for her.
With this compensation solution, the addition of new contract might introduce
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new inconsistencies or might lead to wrong conclusion as mentioned in previous
section of deontic symbolism. We notice that inconsistencies would arise at receiver
side when a sender tries to repeal an old contract primitive by asserting its negation.
Therefore overriding a contract is not just simply adding its negation. This could
make contracts in system inconsistent. An ideal system, thus must help users to
be aware of any conflict when they repeal a contract, for example, by providing
awareness mechanism about conflict.
There is an alternative to remove old contract without introducing a new con-
tract. Rather than negating a contract users might reject its validation.3 This helps
to avoid inconsistency (notice that rejecting is not the same as negating, while with
negation we assert another contract primitive to the system for a negation while
with rejection we just simple add an event to confirm the revocation of an old con-
tract primitive). However, we do not adopt this solution in our current work as the
compensation solution seemed more appropriate to our logging mechanism.
4. Collaborative Process
This section describes the basic protocols of collaborative process over C-PPC
model: logging changes, pushing logs containing document changes and contracts,
and merging pairwise logs.
4.1. Logging Changes
Each site maintains a local clock to count events (write, communication, and con-
tract) generated locally or received from remote sites. When changes are made or
received, they are added to log in the following manner:
• When a site generates a new write event e, it adds e to the end of its
local log in the order of occurrence and augments its clock. The clock value
is assigned to attribute GSN (generate sequence number) of event e (i.e.
e.attr.GSN = clock).
• When a site receives and accepts (from now and afterward we simply say
a site receives a remote log since we do not proceed further in case users
reject the remote log) a log from another site, events from the remote log
that are new to its local log are appended at the end of the local log in the
same order as in the remote log.
• When a user shares a document with another user, she sends a commu-
nication event followed by some contracts, which are logged by receiving
user. We denote by e one of these events (communication or contract). At
time of reception, receiver assigns his local clock to attribute RSN (receive
sequence number) of e, (i.e. e.attr.RSN = clock).
• We assume that a user is unwilling to disclose to other collaborating users
all communication and contract events that she has given to a certain user.
Thus communication and contract events are not kept in the log of the
November 27, 2012 13:8 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE c-ppc
A Contract-extended Push-Pull-Clone Model for Multi-Synchronous Collaboration 21
sender. Moreover, even if a site sends those events to other sites, receiv-
ing sites could refuse integration of remote changes. In this way, sending
sites would contain events that are not accepted by receivers. Therefore,
communication and contract events are not logged by sending site.
• An event e is said committed by site u when it is added (logged) to local
log of u in one of the following cases:
(1) e is a write event generated and saved (kept in log) by u.
(2) e is a contract or communication event given to u by another site
v. Recall that sending site does not keep contract or communication
events in its local log.
An important feature of C-PPC model is that changes of one site are not prop-
agated to all other sites since user trust levels are different and sites might re-
ceive different contracts for the same document state. We discuss the consistency
of proposed model based on the CCI consistency model47 which requires preserving
causality, ensuring document convergence and preserving user intention.
Concerning causality preservation, our model deals with two causal relationships
(denoted as
c−→): causal relation (based on happened-before defined by Lamport21)
and semantic causal relation.
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Fig. 9. Causal relations between events (wi represents for write events and ci represents for contract
or communication events).
• Causal relation: two events e1 and e2 are in a causal relation, denoted as e1 c−→
e2, if:
(1) for two events of the same type (i.e. two write events, two contract events or
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two communication events) e1 and e2 generated by the same site, if e1 was
committed before e2 then e1
c−→ e2. For example, for two write events we
have (e1.attr.by = e2.attr.by) and (e1.attr.GSN < e2.attr.GSN ) and (e1.evt
= e2.evt = write) =⇒ e1 c−→ e2 (see example Fig.2.(a)). For two contract
events we have (e1.attr.to = e2.attr.to) and (e1.attr.by = e2.attr.by) and
(e1.attr.RSN < e2.attr.RSN ) and (e1.evt = e2.evt = contract) =⇒ e1 c−→
e2 [see e.g. Fig.9(a)].
(2) for two events generated by different sites, e1 generated by site u and e2
generated by site v, e1
c−→ e2 if e2 is committed after e1 has been received
(or committed) at site v [see e.g. Fig.9(b)]
• Semantic causal relation: Two contract events e1 and e2 are said to be in a
semantic causal relation if e1 is received by a site before that site sends e2 to
another site. The contract event one site gives to other sites should depend on
her current contracts: (e1.evt = e2.evt = contract) and (e1.attr.to = e2.attr.by)
and (e1.attr.RSN < e2.attr.GSN ) =⇒ (e1 c−→ e2) [see e.g. Fig.9(c)].
The above causal relations between events are used in the auditing mechanism
for detection of users that did not respect the given contracts.
In C-PPC model, logs are propagated by using anti-entropy10 which ensures
the happened-before relation between events as defined by Lamport21 without us-
ing state vectors25 or causal barriers.34 We say that event e1 happened-before e2,
denoted as e1
hb−→ e2, if e2 was generated on some site after e1 was either generated
or received by that site. The happened-before relation is transitive, irreflexive and
antisymmetric. Two events e1 and e2 are said concurrent if neither e1
hb−→ e2 nor
e2
hb−→ e1.
Two events that are in a causal or semantic causal relation are also in a
happened-before relation.
We define a partially ordered set (poset) H = (E,
hb−→) where E is a ground
set of events and
hb−→ is the happened-before relation between two events of E, in
which
hb−→ is irreflexive and transitive. We call H as an event-based history in our
context. Given a partial order
hb−→ over a poset H, we can extend it to a total order
“<t” with which “<t” is a linear order and for every x and y in H, if x
hb−→ y then
x <t y. A linear extension L of H is a relation (E,<t) such that: (1) for all e1, e2 in
E, either e1 <t e2 or e2 <t e1; and (2) if e1
hb−→ e2 then e1 <t e2. This total order
preserves the order of operations from a partial order set H to the linear extensions
on the same ground set E.
We call these linear extensions as individual logs observed by different sites. The
Fig. 10 shows an example of a history and its congruent linear extensions.
In collaborative systems, where multiple sites collaborate on the same shared
data object, we can consider that the global stream of activity of all sites is defined
by a partially ordered set of events. Each site, however, maintains a single log as
its local observation and synchronization. It can see only events in local workspace
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Fig. 10. An example of history and logs
that it generated locally or received from other sites. The site keeps therefore an
individual log as a linearization of history built on a subset of a ground set of
operations. There are remaining events of global history built on entire ground set
of events that are not visible for the site.
4.2. Pushing Logs containing Contracts
A key advantage of weakly consistent replication by relaxing data consistency is that
the protocol for data propagation can accommodate contracts to let users decide
with whom to reconcile. Anti-entropy10,33 is an important mechanism to achieve
eventual consistency among a set of replicas. Basic anti-entropy allows two replicas
to become updated by sending updates generated at one replica to other replica.
Anti-entropy guarantees causal order of events which specifies that if an event is
known to a site then any event preceding that event is already known to the site.
In addition to propagation of changes, since in C-PPC model sites may have
different levels of trust in other sites and the trust relationship may change during
the collaboration, contracts are given to restrict usage on the shared document
when a user shares a document to another user. The user pushes her log as follows:
• Since a document is shared as a log of events, therefore to send a contract for
document usage control, the contract is attached at the end of the log.
• In sharing, a user specifies a new contract; however, she cannot specify a higher
contract than what she currently holds. For instance, if a user u currently holds
a contract C on the document d, she only can share d with another user with
a contract C ′ where C ′ ≤ C (contracts are compared as presented in section
3.3.5).
• A user cannot specify a new contract which conflicts with her current contract.
For instance, if user u has contract C = {Oop}, then she cannot add Fop to C.
• The contracts a user specifies to two distinguished users might be different.
These two users do not not know the contract of the other user as far as they
do not collaborate with each other.
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During the collaborative process the log of each site grows and the document
and contracts are updated each time a user synchronizes with other users.
4.3. Pulling and Merging Pairwise Logs
The collaboration involves logs reconciliation. Consider that a user u receives a
remote log L′ from a remote user v through anti-entropy propagation consisting of
events from site v that site u did not see since their last synchronization. u has to
elect new events from L′ to append to her log L.
Function isMerged(u, v, L, L’, CT, CT’)
1 if Trust(u, v) is low then
// v is distrustful
2 result ← Reject;
3 else
4 if ct′ ∈ CT ′ conflicts ct ∈ CT then
5 if conflict is resolvable then
6 result ← Merge;
7 else result ← Reject;
8 else
9 result ← Merge;
10 return result;
A site might receive a remote log with conflicting contracts. In case of unresolv-
able conflicts, the user decides either to reject the remote document version or to
leave the local version to accept new one. The function isMerged checks for conflict
before merging. It checks if remote log L’ sent by user v can be merged with local
log L of user u. The function takes as arguments the log L of the local site u and
the remote log L′ of the remote site v containing new events since their last syn-
chronization. Given these logs, the current contract holded by u and the contract
that v gives to u when L′ is sent can be computed. We denote these contracts by
CT and CT ′ respectively (CT is the contract holded by u and CT’ is the contract
given to u by v). A site neither merges nor creates a new branch if the sender is
distrustful. We consider a dominance of contract if a user revokes an old contract
and replaces it by a new one. For instance, the old contract Fshare received by site
v from site u can be replaced by a new one Pshare. Two logs can be merged if no
conflict is found.
If the result returned by isMerged function is Merge (merging can be performed),
we perform synchronization by using our proposed merging algorithm. We assume
the merging algorithm ensures causality not only between write events but also
between communication events and contract events. We next discuss in detail how
to ensure causality.
To determine the total order of events committed by one site, we use the “commit
November 27, 2012 13:8 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE c-ppc
A Contract-extended Push-Pull-Clone Model for Multi-Synchronous Collaboration 25
sequence number” CSN. In merging function, commit sequence number CSN is used
to track the last event committed by one site.
As we mentioned before, the attributes of event e, e.attr.GSN and e.attr.RSN
record the values of the clock of its generation and its receipt, respectively. Note
that every event has GSN attribute assigned before log is propagated, but RSN
attribute is assigned to communication and contract events at the receiving site
during the synchronization. The value of CSN of an event e committed by site u is
computed as follows:
• If e is a write event generated by u, the commit sequence number CSN is as-
signed the value of attribute e.attr.GSN. The site who committed e is extracted
from e’s attribute e.attr.by.
• If e is a communication event or a contract event given by a site a to a site v and
committed by site v, the commit sequence number CSN is assigned the value
of attribute e.attr.RSN. The site who commits e is extracted from attribute
e.attr.to.
e
1@A,1
site A, 3
site B, 2
site C, 1
Received log
Summary vector
e
2@B,1
e
3@B,2
e
4@C,1
e
5@A,2
e
6@A,3
Fig. 11. An example of Summary Vector
The fact that the merging function ensures that new events are added only to
the end of log enables the property that if the log of a site u contains an event e
committed by v with a commit sequence number CSN, then it contains all the events
committed by v prior to e. In order to avoid merging events that have been already
integrated, we use a summary vector SV which has the maximum size equal to the
number of users. The summary vector of site u (SVu) keeps the highest commit
sequence number CSN of each site v 6= u known by u in its components SVu[v]
(see the example in Fig.11). A summary vector is a set of time-stamp of commit
sequence numbers, each from a different user indexed by site identifiers. This allows
a site u to correctly determine that an event from site v should be merged into local
log if its CSN is higher than the current entry value of SV corresponding to its
belonging site. The summary vector used here is different from the version vector
used in weakly consistent replication to maintain causal relationship between events
where the size is the number of sites and the version vector needs to be exchanged
together with the corresponding operation. Instead, summary vector is maintained
locally at sites and its size is the number of other sites whose events are known to
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the site.
Function merge(L, L’, clock)
1 for i = 1 to sizeof(L′) do
2 e← L′[i] ;
3 if e.evt = write then
4 CSN ← e.attr.GSN ;
5 site← e.attr.by;
6 else
7 if e.attr.RSN = null then
8 e.attr.RSN ← clock;
9 clock ← clock + 1;
10 site← e.attr.to;
11 CSN ← e.attr.RSN ;
12 if CSN > SV [site] then
13 append e to the end of L;
14 SV [site]← CSN ;
15 return L;
It is possible to replay write events from log to get document state. We can use
any existing CRDT approach35,53,39 in which concurrent operations can be replayed
in any causal order as they are designed to commute in order to ensure document
consistency. The complexity of function merge is O(n) where n is the size of the
remote log L′.
4.4. Log Auditing and Trust Assessment
Compliance checking whether user actions in collaborative system comply with
contracts is an important part of our C-PPC model. This question is done through
logging and auditing mechanisms that are principle in many systems supporting
observation. Log auditing is an approach that adopts a posteriori enforcement. It
complements a priori access control, in order to provide a more flexible way of
controlling compliance of users after the fact. In this subsection we present log
auditing procedure and trust assessment based on auditing results.
4.4.1. Auditing principles
Before presenting our auditing procedure for C-PPC model, we clarify some prin-
ciples concerning our auditing mechanism.
(1) Users can perform auditing of the log in order to make misbehaving users ac-
countable for their actions without the need of any central authority. In this
way the dependence on an online entity that provides auditing logs is overcome.
However, the disadvantage of the mechanism is that users have no knowledge
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about global actions done by all other users in order to completely assess if a
particular user behaved well or not. Our auditing mechanism is therefore based
on incompleteness evidence. Though this assumption could be claimed as a
drawback, it is suitable to human society where a person is assessed only based
on some of her noticed behaviors.
(2) Logs that reflect actions done by users and that are input to the auditing mech-
anism must be maintained correctly. Even though avoiding log tampering is im-
practical in distributed environments, tampering detection is possible. We have
proposed using authenticators for detecting log tampering.50 Log tampering is
detected at time of synchronization before the log is accepted by receivers.
(3) How to use log auditing result and treat data resulted from misused actions?
When a user discovers other users that misbehaved, she updates their trust
levels. Users use trust models to manage their friend reputation. The trust
levels obtained from auditing result are used as input data for a trust model.
We focus only on using auditing result to update trust values. We exclude any
further aspects of trust models such as how to propagate personal view of trust
among users or how to use external resources to assess trust values or how to
aggregate trust values.
These above principles distinguish our auditing mechanism from other prior ap-
proaches. In following subsections we identify situations when contracts are violated
and then provide the log auditing mechanism.
4.4.2. Contract violation
In this subsection we specify the three types of attacks that might lead to contract
violation.
• Malicious users tamper logs to eliminate or modify contracts or other events
in the log. We consider that a user u is malicious if she re-orders, inserts or
deletes events in the log that consequently affects auditing result. For instance,
u removes some obligations that she does not want to fulfill. The log auditing
mechanism assumes logs are authenticated. Any tampering should be detected
by the log authentication mechanism.
• Malicious users perform actions that are forbidden by the specified contracts.
These action events are labelled as bad.
• Users neglect obligations that need to be fulfilled. For instance, a user receives
an obligation “insert is obligatory” but she never fulfills this obligation. If at a
given moment a log auditing mechanism is performed and no event that fulfills
the obligation is found, we cannot claim that the user misbehaved. He might
fulfill the obligation at a later time. The given obligation is labelled as unknown
meaning that the obligation has not yet been fulfilled. Once the obligation is
fulfilled, the unknown label is removed.
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Users are expected to respect given contracts. If a user respects all given con-
tracts, then she will get a good trust value assessed by others. Ideally, if a user
misbehaves in one of the three ways mentioned above, his misbahaviour should be
detected by other users. The auditing mechanism returns a trust value that is com-
puted from the number of events labelled with good, unknown and bad. Note that
this manner of computing trust values does not distinguish an accidental attack
from an intentional attack. In order to make users aware of unintentional misuses,
the system prevents users in case a contract is violated by reminding them the
obligations they hold.
4.4.3. Log auditing
An initial idea of our proposed log auditing mechanim was proposed in our previous
work 48. Our auditing procedure aims at finding contract violations and making
users accountable for their actions by adjusting their trust levels following a trust
metric. The general idea of the auditing procedure is to browse the log and check
each event appearing in the log whether it conforms to given contracts. For each
violation of a particular user found, we increase the number of bad events counted
for the user. Similarly for each obligation that is not yet fulfilled, we increase the
number of unknown events. This statistic of contract violations by a user over all
events that are audited is used to compute the trust level of this user.
Procedures updateAuditState and audit present auditing protocol and trust com-
putation in details when a user u audits actions of all other users, say v, who appears
in the log. In these procedures, Gv and Qv are used to keep a set of contracts and
a set of obligations which user v holds, respectively (Qv ∈ Gv). At the initial step,
Gv = ∅ and Qv = ∅. For each event e in the log L, the procedure updateAuditState
checks its event type, contract or write event. If e is a contract given to user v
then it is added to Gv. Moreover, if e is an obligation, it is counted as unknown
event until an event that fulfills it will be found. If e is a write or a communication
event performed by user v, it is checked if it complies with or violates contracts in
Gv. In the procedure for updating auditing state, for each user v, numberOfBadE-
vents[v] and numberOfUnknownEvents[v] are used to count the number of bad and
unknown events that are audited, respectively (remaining events are considered
good). auditedEvents[v] is used to count the total number of audited events. All
users v audited by u are inserted in set V . At the initial step of audit procedure,
these variables: numberOfBadEvents[v], numberOfUnknownEvents[v] and auditedE-
vents[v] are set equal to 0, and the set V is set empty.
Procedure audit takes as input the local log L of user u and the position in
the log lastCheckedPos identifying the last event checked in the previous auditing
mechanism. L is browsed to check whether each behavior of other users is correct.
When log analysis is finished, trust values of all audited users v in V are recom-
puted based on auditing results. By doing this, their accountability is made through
updating their trustworthiness.
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Procedure updateAuditState(e)
1 if (e.evt =′ contract′) then
2 v ← e.to;
3 Gv ← Gv ∪ {e};
4 if e overrides c in Gv then
5 Gv ← Gv \ {c};
6 if (e.attr.modal =′ O′) then
7 Qv ← Qv ∪ {e};
8 numberOfUnknownEvents[v] + +;
9 else
10 v ← e.by;
11 if e violates Gv then
12 numberOfBadEvents[v] + +;
13 if e fulfills c in Qv then
14 Qv ← Qv \ {c};
15 numberOfUnknownEvents[v]−−;
16 V ← V ∪ {v};
17 numberOfAuditedEvents[v] + +;
A user can perform log auditing at any time at local site and trust values are
updated personally. Log analysis has polynomial order of n time complexity O(n)
with n is the number of events that are audited. In case auditing creates significant
overhead, users might skip auditing some parts of log which were done by highly
trusted users. However, in case these users behave badly, they are discovered only
in a next auditing phase.
Procedure audit(L, lastCheckedPos)
1 for i = lastCheckedPos + 1 to length(L) do
2 e← ith event in L;
3 updateAuditState(e);
4 foreach v in V do
5 re-compute trust for user v;
In order to manage trust levels, we need a decentralized trust model. The trust
level of a user assessed by one another could be aggregated from log-based trust,
reputation trust and recommendation trust. Trust computation varies from trust
models. In order to provide a complete trust model, in our future work we will
propose a trust metric based on the log auditing result.
5. Evaluation
In this section, we present the evaluation of our proposed model by performing some
experiments using a peer-to-peer simulator and give some discussions around the
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proposed model.
5.1. Correctness of C-PPC Model
The C-PPC model uses operation-based optimistic replication. The core data struc-
ture used in the model is a partially order log. Events (write, communication and
contract) are communicated using anti-entropy protocol which ensures causality.
The document is achieved correctly if and only if the log was not tampered. This is
an assumption of our model. Our solution about the construction and verification
of authenticators to secure log are presented in our previous work.50 Authentica-
tors prevent re-ordering of log events and therefore causality is preserved. If log
was tampered, receiving site might discard it and the trust level of the site that
misbehaved would be decremented.
Concerning the document convergence, as C-PPC model uses CRDT for com-
mutative operations, it ensures that in the presence of different contracts received
by different sites when the same set of write operations was executed at those sites,
their copies of the shared document are identical. However, the shared document
might be in different states on two sites since the shared document is not uniformly
distributed due to the use of contracts and the trust levels of users. And finally,
concerning the property of intention preservation of C-PPC model, it is ensured by
causality preservation and CRDT algorithm.
The C-PPC model supports multi-synchronous collaboration which allows si-
multaneous work in isolation workspace even when network is disconnected and
user changes are propagated and synchronized with reconnection. The extension of
using contract for PPC model made the condition that the logs are synchronized
more complex due to the arising of contract conflict. However, users can use log
auditing mechanism to detect any conflict of contracts and logs are synchronized
together if and only if all conflicts are resolvable. Conflicts can be resolved by the
rejection of the owner or by the overriding of user with high role in system (the
order of users can be voted between users in system).
5.2. Experiments
Due to the unavailability of real data traces of collaboration including contract,
we evaluate the feasibility of C-PPC model through simulation using PeerSim
simulator.29 We focus first on the ability of detecting misbehaving users; then we
estimate the overhead generated by using contract.
5.2.1. Setup
We setup the simulation with a network of 200 users in which a number of users
are set as honest users, and the remain are set as misbehaving users. The portion of
honest/misbehaving users in different experiments varies depending on the purpose
of evaluation.
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For simulating process, we generate randomly the data flow of collaboration
during the simulation. The data flow includes operations, contracts and users with
whom to share. The network topology with which users share log to their neighbors
are built randomly by the simulator. One interaction is defined as a process of
sharing a log with a specified contract, from one user to another one. Since the
total number of interactions generated should be pseudo uniformly distributed over
all users, we let one user perform sharing with not more than 3 other users at each
step. Similarly, the number of operations and contracts generated by one user each
time is at most 10 operations and 3 contracts (if we consider only 3 types of actions
in our system: insertion, deletion and sharing).
Each node in network represents for one user. Between two interactions, nodes
generate local operations randomly but must follow its current contract. Nodes keep
their contractual state temporarily to generate correctly operations. However not
every node respect its contracts. While honest nodes generate allowed operations,
misbehaving nodes generate operations that violate their contracts. This data is
used to evaluate our algorithms of detecting misbehavior.
Since contracts are generated randomly with only limited condition that they
should not bigger than node’s current contract (contracts are ordered as in previous
section), conflict certainly arises in simulation between contracts of different nodes.
As nodes in simulator cannot behave human acts, we omit negotiation protocol for
contracts. Furthermore, to simplify we do not allow neither total-total inconsisten-
cies nor partial-total inconsistencies for contracts hold by nodes. Contract conflict
thus are detected before logs are synchronized. Once conflict are found, logs are
rejected to be merged and the node which detected conflict waits for next cycle or
for other nodes which send log without conflicting (see our Algorithm isMerged).
With this restriction logs are always maintained under consistent contracts.
5.2.2. Experiment 1 - Misbehavior detection
To evaluate the ability of misbehavior detection, we check first the ability to detect
a selected misbehaving user according to the total number of interactions performed
by all users. The estimation is performed on a collaborative network of 200 users
with 60 misbehaving users (30% of users are misbehaving users). The auditing pro-
cess is performed after each synchronization with another user. We select randomly
one misbehaving user to be audited and we analyze the percentage of users that can
detect him. Fig. 12 shows the results recorded after each cycle. We can see that the
misbehaving user is detected by a few users at the beginning and then the number
of users that detect his misbehavior increases along with the increasing of number
of interactions.
Second, we check the percentage of misbehaving users that can be detected.
We select randomly one honest user from the network to observe the percentage of
misbehaving users that she can detect. Fig. 13 shows the result according to the
number of synchronizations done by the selected user with others. We can see from
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Fig. 12. Ability to detect one selected misbehaving user with respect to the total number of
interactions in a collaborative network of 200 users with 30% of them are misbehaving users.
the graph that up to 20% of misbehaving users are detected after the first four
synchronizations (auditing is done four times), and after the fifth synchronization
more than 80% of misbehaving users are detected. We can see a drastic change
in the figure between the fourth and the fifth synchronization. That change is due
to a synchronization of the log of selected user with a remote log that contains
misbehavior of most remaining misbehaving users. This can occur in distributed
networks of random topology where clusters of collaborating users exist. Once an
interaction occurs between two users belonging to such clusters, misbehaving users
of the two clusters are discovered. Only about 10% of misbehaving users may require
more interactions to be detected. From results in Fig. 13 we can see that the ability
to detect misbehaving users depends also on the topology of collaborative network.
In the future work we will perform more experiments to evaluate how topology
would affect the detection.
In order to have a global view about the evolution of the percentage of detected
misbehaving users, we compute the average value of detected misbehaving users over
all users of the collaborative network. Fig. 14 shows, on average, the percentage of
misbehaving users that are detected by one user. We perform the experiment in
case of a low, medium and high population of misbehaving users in the network
(respectively 5%, 30%, 80% of misbehaving users). The results show that the system
still functions well in case of a high/low population of misbehaving users.
5.2.3. Experiment 2 - Overhead estimation
We conduct this experiment to evaluate the time overhead generated by using con-
tract for the synchronization and auditing mechanism. We compare two models:
with and without contract. To be able to make the comparison between these two
models, we follow the same data flow. In the model without contract, the synchro-
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Fig. 13. Percentage of detected misbehaving users with respect to the number of synchronizations
done by selected honest user.
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Fig. 14. Average percentage of detected misbehaving users with respect to to the total number of
interactions in the collaborative network.
nization mechanism requires merging logs of write events only. In the model with
contract the synchronization mechanism requires merging logs of write events and
contract events. Additionally, an auditing mechanism for user misbehavior detection
has to be applied.
We compute for each model the total time (T) of all the synchronizations per-
formed by a given user to build the same state of document, T =
∑
ti, where ti is
the time required for the ith synchronization. Fig. 15 shows the result according to
the number of write operations in the local log. From these results we can see that
the time overhead generated by using contract is reasonable since the difference
of time overhead computed for two models increases slowly with an increasing of
number of events.
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5.3. Discussion
In this section we discuss some potential limitations in our work. First, contract-
based collaboration does not offer a solution for plagiarism and violation of contracts
outside of the system. Beyond write, communication and contract events that a
computer system could log, there are always side channels that can work around
the logging. For example, a malicious user could replay write events from a log to
create a new document and then share it and claim herself as being the owner. Or
a malicious user could reveal the content of the document outside of the system by
using communication means such as email, telephone call and chat, these actions
being not logged by the system. These violations can be detected by humans or by
using plagiarism techniques, however, this is out of the scope of this paper. The
proposed model uses contract as a means to express data usage restrictions that
helps to protect data privacy and to build a trustworthy collaborative environment.
A second limitation of our approach is how to deal with the growing size of
the log during collaborative process. The log should be ultimately truncated so
that it does not grow without bound. That requires some additional constraints
and consensus of collaborators. Once the cycle of collaboration grows big after a
long period, log of operations can be converted to state of document. After this
conversion the log is emptied and all contracts recorded are not kept any more.
Removing all contracts is reasonable since the behavior kept a long time ago might
not be suitable to evaluate trust level at present. At the moment we do not consider
log truncation in the proposed model.
Third limitation is that we have not fully explored a wide range of contracts that
can be specified in our collaboration model. In C-PPC model, contracts are based
on a basic deontic logic including permission, prohibition, and obligation. They
can be combined with operators from temporal logic to express time dimension of
contracts, however, we will consider this in our further work.
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Next, we discuss the ability to apply the C-PPC model to multiple documents
rather than a single one. Our approach is a general solution and thus it is appli-
cable to multiple documents. We can keep a single log for operations over multiple
documents. As an example, the single log is kept for operations of different files in a
source code project using Mercurial distributed version control system. Each file has
its unique identifier in the project, so we can keep operations with an additional at-
tribute of file identifier to distinguish them. In each interaction of sharing, contract
can include multiple contract primitives that refer to rights and duties of user on
different files at the same time. For editing operations on documents, we use CRDT
approaches, so concurrent operations can be replayed in any order without making
document content diverge. When our approach is applied to multiple documents,
the approach works without considering file system operations such as moving a file
or renaming a file. We can allow these file operations in our approach if a solution
of CRDT for file systems is proposed. However, this is out of scope of this paper.
6. Related Work
Our work is related to several topics in the area of privacy and data management
in multi-synchronous working environment such as contract-based models, usage
control models, access control models, trust management and log auditing for log-
based collaboration. In this section we briefly survey the most relevant works and
point out the differences of our work with respect to these approaches
The contractual approach is useful for a wide range of applications, such as
resource management, cooperative task execution, cooperative work in distributed
systems and software engineering. Traditionally a contract is an agreement between
two or more persons about actions that are performed. Contracts also regulate be-
havior when persons cooperate or use shared resources. Contracts exist in many
systems. It is either implicit in communication protocols, software licenses, down-
loading and sharing policies in P2P file-sharing systems or explicit in paper-based
contracts of using network services. The push-pull-clone model for collaborative
editing source code was adopted in distributed version control systems but users
are uniformly trusted and there are no contracts specified during collaboration.
Wikipedia features an informal contract-based model where contracts are checked
by crowd sourcing. Anybody can edit according to rules that are checked a posteri-
ori by other people. In contract-based models rules have to be explicitly expressed
and checked by the system. Existing work has focused primarily on either contract
models for individual aspects or collaboration models with implicit contracts. Some
works proposed a contract framework (see, for example Contract Framework 44,43,
Contract Net protocol 45, Agreement Framework 40) for negotiating and controlling
resource usage in a distributed system and engaging to solve the connection prob-
lem between nodes with tasks to be executed simultaneously. Contracts express the
terms under which nodes in network promise (obligation) to offer and to get payment
with regard of exchanging resources. The contract model which deals with contract
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specification including of the server, the client, the resource, the negotiation, the
signature scheme is different from our contract-based C-PPC model. Rather than
focusing on how to express contracts, in our model, we regard contracts as events of
deontic modals and operations. We deal with contract specification, merging con-
tracts and conflict resolution between conflict contracts. In order to guarantee the
fulfillment of contracts, we adopt the same view as the contract model in Shand et
al.44 on using a distributed trust model to audit participant actions if they conform
contracts.
Contractual approach is also adopted in software engineering. Me´tayer et al.27,26
proposed a set of methods and tools to define software liabilities among parties.
Proposed framework includes the formal definition of liability and the analysis of
log files to verify contractual liability a posteriori to make parties accountable. The
proposed framework is similar to our approach regarding a posteriori accountability
based on log analysis. However, the contractual framework is not possible to be
applied to multi-synchronous collaboration systems where contracts are replicated
and synchronized as in our C-PPC model.
Access control mechanisms are designed to limit which authorized users can
access to and use data or resources in a computer system. This checking is performed
before the access is allowed. Role-based access control (see, for example, RBAC42,
OrBAC1, OASIS4, NIST15) simplifies the specification and management of security
policies within an enterprise. Most RBAC models allow permissions to be assigned
to a functional role or set of roles which are hierarchically organized. The idea
of incorporating attributes to RBAC models to provide more flexible RBAC was
presented in Goh et al.16, Kumar et al.20 Our contract-based model is notably
different compared to access control mechanisms. The model gives access first to
data without control but with restrictions that are verified a posteriori.
In the field of access control, usage control is regarded as an extension of data
protection beyond access control.36 Usage control policies can be enforced by using
a detective enforcement or a preventive enforcement.14 Our work belongs to the
category of detective enforcement usage control mechanisms. The C-PPC model
does not help to prevent users from violating contracts; instead it makes users aware
of received contracts and of other users that violated contracts. The auditing result
will be used to evaluate user trustworthiness. We formalize contracts upon basic
terms of right and obligation which are common in many existing works (see UCON
model).17,57 Unfortunately existing usage control models do not support multi-
synchronous collaboration where users can work concurrently on shared documents.
Therefore, they do not deal with merging policies and resolving conflicts among
contracts.
Purpose-based access control, another approach for privacy preserving access
control based on the notion of purpose, has made a significant impact on many
access control systems. Purpose is a central concept in many privacy access control
models for database systems2,22 and the notion of purpose was clearly defined in
Byun et al.6 The concept of Hippocratic databases was introduced by Agrawal et
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al.2 for privacy protection within relational database systems. The proposed struc-
ture Strawman Architecture consists of privacy policies and privacy authorizations
to define usage purposes. Lefevre et al.22 presented an approach of enforcing pri-
vacy policy in database systems to let providers have control over their users on
what they are allowed to see their personal data and for what purpose. Byun et
al.6 presented a model in which purpose information is associated with given data
element to specify the intended use of the data element to give user in the context of
relational databases. Even though these approaches define privacy policies of which
purpose data can be accessed at a later time, the real access is only given after the
access purpose was checked against the intended purposes was associated to the
data item at a prior time. This is different from our contract-based model where
contract is checked a posteriori. The purpose-based access control is pessimistic
in considering that users are not trusted in requesting data for the right purpose.
Conversely, our contract-based model is optimistic and allows users to use data first
and auditing is performed later. The optimistic model is more suitable to collabo-
rative environments where users need a certain level of mutual trust to collaborate
with each other. Another major difference is that all these approaches were mainly
applied for centralized database systems where policies can be verified by a central
authority. In our approach we applied a contract-based model for multi-synchronous
working environment where there is no central log that can be audited.
C-PPC collaboration model is closely related to the approach proposed by Wob-
ber et al.54 for ensuring security and privacy in a weakly consistent replication sys-
tem where users are not uniformly trusted. Access control policy claims are treated
as data items. The guards added to replication protocol enforce specified policies at
synchronization step. A replica must check whether the requested action is allowed
by the policy and then decide whether to accept or deny updates. In this approach,
each replica is a local authority that maintains current policies. This is similar to our
approach where we let each user perform self-auditing based on local view of other
users actions. However, the approach of Wobber et al. only expresses rights but not
obligations that each replica should follow. Moreover, only the author of an item
can define the policy associated to it and hence there is no requirement to resolve
conflicts between policies. In our approach, we need to deal with policy conflicts as
multiple contributors can specify different contracts on the shared document. More-
over, the system uses a state-based replication where each site applies updates to its
replica without maintaining a change log rather than an operation-based replication
as in our work.
Trust management is an important aspect of the solution that we proposed. The
concept of trust in different communities varies according to how it is computed
and used. Our work relies on the concept of trust which is based on past user
behaviors. 31 With C-PPC model users first bring social trust into the system.
However trust is not immutable and it changes over time. Thus trust should be
managed by using a trust model. A trust model includes three basic components24
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that are gathering behavioral information, scoring and ranking peers and rewarding
or punishing peers. Most of existing P2P trust models (e.g. EigenTrust model18)
propose mechanisms to update trust values based on direct interactions between
peers while we use log auditing to help one user evaluate others either through
direct or indirect interactions. We are not aware of any existing trust model that
takes log auditing result into trust assessment.
Log auditing technique is a general principle in systems supporting observa-
tion. Keeping and managing event logs is frequently used for ensuring security and
privacy. This approach has been studied in many works. In Cederquist et al.7, a
log auditing approach is used for detecting misbehavior in collaborative work en-
vironments, where a small group of users shares a large number of documents and
policies. In Kruhow et al.19,38, authors present a logical policy-centric framework
for behavior-based decision making. The framework consists of a formal model of
past behaviors of principals which is based on event structures. However, these
models7,19,38 require a central authority that has the ability to observe all actions
of all users. This assumption is not valid for a purely distributed PPC collaboration.
The complexity of our log auditing mechanism compared to centralized solutions
comes from the fact that each user has only a partial overview of the global collab-
oration and can audit only users with whom he collaborates. Therefore, a user can
take decisions only from the information he possesses from the users with whom he
collaborates.
7. Conclusion
We have presented a contract extended push-pull-clone model (C-PPC) for multi-
synchronous collaboration where users share their private data with some contracts
that receivers should comply and rust levels are adapted according to users’ past
behavior regarding conformance to given contracts. Changes on shared data per-
formed by users and contracts given when data is shared are logged in a distributed
manner. We formalised the notions of contracts expressed inside the C-PPC model.
We proposed a merging algorithm that deals not only with changes on data but also
with contracts and a conflict resolution mechanism among contracts specified in par-
allel by multiple contributors. A mechanism of log auditing in distributed manner
is applied during collaboration and users who did not conform to given contracts
are detected and made accountable by having their trust levels decremented. We
implemented the proposed collaboration model with a number of simulations us-
ing PeerSim simulator. Experiment results show the feasibility of our model. Some
directions of future work include proposing a trust metric that is suitable for our
C-PPC model and exploring a wider range of contracts that can be specified by
users.
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